GPS World, August 2012

Finally I recommend that the DHS commit to funding development and implementation of a cryptographic authentication signature in one of the existing or forthcoming civil GPS signals Complete testimony at www gpsworld com humphreys covers The potential vulnerabilities of U S national transportation communications banking and finance and energy distribution infrastructure What does it take to build a spoofer Buy a spoofer Range and required knowledge of target Fixing the problem t BNNJOH UP OPJTF TFOTJOH EFGFOTF t FGFOTF CBTFE PO 444 PS PO 8 4 TJHOBMT t VMUJ TZTUFN NVMUJ HSFRVFODZ EFGFOTF t 4JOHMF BOUFOOB EFGFOTF t FGFOTF CBTFE PO TQSFBE TQFDUSVN TFDVSJUZ DPEFT PO t FGFOTF CBTFE PO OBWJHBUJPO NFTTBHF BVUIFOUJDBUJPO PO PS t PSSFMBUJPO QSPMF BOPNBMZ EFGFOTF t VMUJ BOUFOOB EFGFOTF t FGFOTF CBTFE PO DSPTT DPSSFMBUJPO XJUI NJMJUBSZ TJHOBMT GPS GLONASS THE SYSTEM High Performance GNSS Antennas Precision and Military Commercial WideBand OEM GNSS SATCOM Antennas Žǁ sŽůƚĂŐĞ KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ Ϯ ϱs Iridium Globalstar Timing Antennas GPS Antenna Receivers dĂůůǇƐŵĂŶ tŝƌĞůĞƐƐ ŶĐ A TIME AND PLACE for Everything ƌŝĚŝƵŵΡ ĂŶĚ ůŽďĂůƐƚĂƌΡ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂĚĞŵĂƌŬƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƟǀĞ ŽǁŶĞƌƐ and given that these are all non safety of life commercial signals the sources are subject to the vagaries of power outages regular maintenance and breakdowns Nevertheless with such a multitude of signals NAVSOP could well turn out to be a viable back up for GNSS So shared access to civil airspace wider applications in commercial operations and changes in equipment qualification along with potential solutions for GNSS jamming and spoofing lots to consider for the UAS industry Taking It to the House U S House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommitte on Oversight Investigations and Management Hearing July 19 2012 Using Unmanned Aerial Systems Within the Homeland Security Game Changer Testimony by Todd E Humphreys Ph D Assistant Professor Cockrell School of Engineering The University of Texas at Austin Excerpted Prof Humphreys is a co author of the Drone Hack article on page 30 of this issue The vulnerability of civil GPS to spoofing has serious implications for civil unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs as was recently illustrated by a dramatic remote hijacking of a UAV at White Sands Missile Range Hacking a UAV by GPS spoofing is but one expression of a larger problem insecure civil GPS technology has over the last two decades been absorbed deeply into critical systems within our national infrastructure Besides UAVs civil GPS spoofing also presents a danger to manned aircraft maritime craft communications systems banking and finance institutions and the national power grid Constructing from scratch a sophisticated GPS spoofer like the one developed by the University of Texas is not easy It is not within the capability of the average person on the street or even the average Anonymous hacker But the emerging tools of software defined radio and the availability of GPS signal simulators are putting spoofers within reach of ordinary malefactors There is no quick easy and cheap fix for the civil GPS spoofing problem What is more not even the most effective GPS spoofing defenses are foolproof But reasonable costeffective spoofing defenses exist which if implemented will make successful spoofing much harder I recommend that for non recreational operation in the national airspace civil UAVs exceeding 18 lbs be required to employ navigation systems that are spoof resistant More broadly I recommend that GPS based timing or navigation systems having a non trivial role in systems designated by DHS as national critical infrastructure be required to be spoof resistant www gpsworld com August 2012 GPS World 15